MEDICARE MANAGED CARE FROM THE
BENEFICIARY'S PERSPECTIVE
EleanorD. Kinney, JD., M.P.H.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whatever future legislation to change the Medicare program
comes out of the current debate over the 1997 federal budget, the
Medicare program will continue to move toward capitated managed care for Medicare beneficiaries. Capitated managed care is
fast becoming the predominant model for the delivery of health
care services in the United States today as both public and private
payers seek to control the escalating costs of health care services.
Although coming lately to capitated managed care,' Medicare, like
the rest of the health care system, will ultimately embrace capitated
managed care for most Medicare beneficiaries. The question is
not whether, but when and how. This Article offers some thoughts
on how beneficiaries can and should be protected as Medicare
moves its beneficiaries from delivery systems with fee-for-service
providers toward managed health plans paid on a capitated basis.
This Article first reviews the history of the Medicare program
and how the program has historically approached managed care.
This history is important, for it reflects some of the appropriate
caution that Congress and the Executive Branch in both Republican and Democratic administrations have exhibited toward health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) for Medicare beneficiaries.
Second, the Article reviews Medicare's experience to date with
capitated managed care including key legislative enactments and
procedural methods for protecting beneficiaries in capitated
health plans. Next, the Article reviews the proposals for reform of
the Medicare program before Congress today and assesses their
merits in terms of protecting the entitlement of beneficiaries to
statutory health benefits under the Medicare program. Finally, the
Article addresses the central question of what procedural arrangements ought to be in place in Medicare managed care plans to
t This article was delivered at the Symposium on Consumer Protection in
Managed Care, on November 17, 1995, at the Seton Hall University School of Law.
* Professor of Law and Director, The Center for Law and Health, Indiana Univer-

sity School of Law - Indianapolis. J.D. 1973, Duke University; M.P.H. 1979, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; A.B. 1969, Duke University. The author wishes
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I See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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assure the protection of all Medicare beneficiaries. In so doing,
the article draws heavily on my previous scholarship on the Medicare program and procedural protections for consumers in today's
2
health care system.

II.

BACKGROUND ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM

Congress enacted the Medicare program in 1965 with the
strong support of President Lyndon Johnson.3 The program was
another linchpin in the Social Security system established under
the democratic presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. In the 1940s,
President Harry Truman had tried to enact health insurance for
the aged and failed. President John Kennedy and Vice President
Lyndon Johnson had stressed health insurance for the elderly as a
major campaign theme in 1960. At that time, the problem of access to quality health care services for the aged was especially severe. In 1963, although the aged had a greater risk of illness and
far lower income than other population groups, only 56% had
health insurance. 4 Passage of Medicare was a Democratic Party triumph. PresidentJohnson signed the bill on the porch of President
Truman's home in Independence, Missouri, stating at the time:
"No longer will older Americans be denied the healing powers of
modem medicine. No longer will illness crush and destroy the savover a lifetime so that they
ings that they have so carefully put" away
5
might enjoy dignity in later years.
Over the years, the Medicare program has grown and become
2 See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated
AM.J. OF L. & MED. - (1996) (in press); Eleanor D. Kinney, ResolvHealthPlans,
(1995)
HEALTH MATIx ing Consumer Grievancesin a Managed CareEnvironment, _
(in press); Eleanor D. Kinney, Protecting Consumers and Providers under Health Reform:
An Overview of the Major AdministrativeLaw Issues, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 83 (1995); Eleanor
D. Kinney, The Role of Judicial Review Regarding Medicare and Medicaid Program Policy:

Past Experience and Future Expectations, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 759 (1991); Eleanor D.
Kinney, In Search of BureaucraticJustice in the Medicare Program: Adjudicating Medicare
Home Health Benefits in the 1980s, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 251 (1990); Eleanor D. Kinney,
Setting Limits: A Realistic Assignment for the MedicareProgram, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 631
(1989); Eleanor D. Kinney, National CoveragePolicy Under the MedicareProgram: Problems

and Proposalsfor Change, 32 ST. Louis U. LJ. 869 (1988); Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage andPayment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 1 (1987).

3 Social Security Amendments of 1965, § 101, Pub. L. No. 79-97, 79 Stat. 286
(1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (adding Title
XVIII: Health Insurance for the Aged to the Social Security Act).
4 Marian Gornik et al., Twenty Years of Medicare and Medicaid: Covered Populations,
Use of Benefits, and Program Expenditures, HEAT CARE FIN. REv. 13, 14 (1985 Supp.).
5 Remarks at the Signing of the Medicare Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 811, 813 (July 30,
1965).
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a linchpin in the social safety net for all Americans. The Medicare
program now serves 36.3 million Americans, or just over seven percent of the population. 6 An estimated twenty-nine million persons
were actual users of the Medicare program during 1993.1 The average per enrollee expenditure for the Medicare program in 1992
was $3,391.8 Over half of Medicare beneficiaries had payments of
less than $500 per year, while only 9.8 percent of Medicare beneficiaries (3.5 million) incurred payments of $10,000 or more.9
In 1993, federal expenditures for the Medicare program were
$151 billion.' 0 Medicare expenditures accounted for 10% of the
federal budget in Fiscal Year 1995.11 Medicare expenditures are
increasing dramatically compared to other components of health
spending. The rate of increase in Medicare expenditures between
12
1980 and 1992 was 11.5%, a figure lower than in earlier decades.
Although substantial reforms were made in the way in which the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) paid hospitals and
physicians in the 1980s,'" these inflationary trends in Medicare expenditures continue to cause concern. Indeed, it is estimated that
the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, which finances Part
A of the Social Security wage tax, will be exhausted in 2002.14
These trends in Medicare expenditures are driving the push for
capitated managed care for Medicare beneficiaries.
A.

Medicare Benefits, Coverage and Administration
The Medicare program provides basic health insurance to the

6 Katharine R. Levit et al.,
NationalHealth Expenditures, 1993,16 HEALTH CARE FIN.
REv.247, 263 (1994).
7 OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEMONSTRATIONS, HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE AND MEDICAID STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, HEALTH
CARE FIN. REVIEW 1, 24 (1995).
8 Id.
9 Id.; see Statement of Marilyn Moon, Senior Fellow, The Urban Institute, Proposed Changes in the Structure of Medicare Under the Balanced Budget Act of 1995
(Jan. 17, 1996) (discussing proposed changes and their implications); Statement of
Bruce Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Fin. Admin. to the Subcommittee on
Health, House Committee on Ways and Means (Feb. 10, 1995) (addressing the subcommittee regarding the current state and future of the Medicare program).
10 Levit et al.,
supra note 6, at 262.
11 See generallyOFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GovERNmENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET (1995).
12 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 7, at 16.
13 See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
14 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE TRUST FUNDS, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS-A SUMMARY OF THE 1995 ANNUAL REPORTS (1996) (available via World Wide Web at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/

trusteessummary_1995.html).
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elderly, severely disabled, and people with End Stage Renal Disease. 15 The program is comprised of two separate programs. Part
A, the Hospital Insurance Program, provides hospital and related
services and is financed through a payroll tax on all workers.16 Part
B, the Supplementary Medical Insurance Program, provides physician and outpatient services and is financed by premiums from
beneficiaries.1 7 Medicare also pays for these services through
HMOs and other capitated managed care plans as described
below. 18
Medicare is administered by the HCFA in the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), which in turn contracts with
private insurers to handle claims, appeals, and other matters. For
fee-for-service Medicare, fiscal intermediaries administer payments
and claims from Part A providers; carriers administer payment and
claims for Part B providers. 9 Medicare also contracts with private
peer review organizations to review the quality of care accorded
Medicare beneficiaries, handle beneficiary appeals arising out of
hospitalization, and perform other oversight functions for the
Medicare program.2 0
1.

Medicare Benefits

The benefits provided under Part A, the hospital insurance
component, include ninety days of basic hospitalization for each
spell of illness.2 1 Part A coverage also includes a stay of 100 days in
a skilled nursing facility following a hospitalization, 2 an unlimited
number of home health agency visits if the beneficiary is confined
to home and in need of skilled nursing care, 23 and some limited
hospice services for patients who are terminally ill. 2 4 When patients avail themselves of the hospital benefit, they must pay a deductible amounting to the cost of the first day of hospitalization; in
addition, some coinsurance is required after the sixtieth day of a
hospital stay.25 Coinsurance is also required for skilled nursing
U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (1988).
17 See id.
18 See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
15 42

19

42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h & u.

20

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

21

42 U.S.C. § 1395d.

22

Id.
See id. § 1395x(m) (defining home health services).
Id. § 1395d(d).
Id. § 1395e.

23
24
25
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services, but not for home health services."
The benefits furnished under Part B, the supplementary medical insurance component, include physician services plus a wide
variety of other medical services provided on an outpatient basis. 7
Finally, an increasingly important and costly Part B benefit is the
lease or purchase of durable medical equipment.2 8 There is no
limitation on the number of physician services which fall under
Part B coverage.29 Enrollees pay an annual deductible of $100 and
pay 20% coinsurance on most covered services incurred during the
year.3 o
2.

Medicare Coverage Policy

Coverage is an important concept in understanding Medicare
benefits, particularly the disputes over benefits that arise between
beneficiaries, providers, and the Medicare program. In effect, coverage defines the type and the amount of health care benefits for
which the Medicare program will pay, as well as the conditions that
must be met in order to receive payment. The Social Security Act
specifies certain types of services that are expressly excluded from
coverage under the Medicare program.3 1 For both Part A and Part
B, such services include physicals, immunizations, eyeglasses
and
32
hearing aids, personal comfort items, and cosmetic surgery.
One is entitled to coverage only if two conditions are met.
First, the services must be "reasonable and necessary" for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness or injury. 33 Second, the services
rendered must not be covered by another public insurance
program. 4
Currently, the Medicare program makes coverage policy in a
fairly informal process that has generated considerable criticism
Id. § 1395e(a) (3).
Id. § 1395k. These include services provided in hospital outpatient departments
and rural health clinics; outpatient surgery; diagnostic x-ray and laboratory services;
rehabilitative services; physical, occupational, and speech therapy; and services ordered by a physician but performed by physicians' assistants and nurse practitioners.
Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. § 1395y(a) (1) (listing those items and services explicitly excluded from
coverage).
30 Id. §§ 13951(a)-(b) (explaining payment of benefits in terms of amounts paid
and deductible provisions).
31 See id. § 1395y (listing exclusions from coverage).
32 See id.
33 Id.§ 1395y(a)(1).
34 Id.§§ 139 5y(a)(2)-(3).
26
27
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over the years."5 HCFA publishes the decisions on coverage on
new technologies and other specific items and services in its Medicare CoverageIssues Manual' and other Medicare program manuals.
In 1989, HCFA published a proposed rule outlining its coverage
policy-making procedures.3 7 HCFA has not yet officially adopted
this rule. In August 1989, HCFA published a notice on its procedures for promulgating national coverage policy and included major coverage determinations.3 8
In 1986, Congress created an explicit bar to procedural challenges to Medicare national coverage determinations 39 on the
grounds that current procedures for making national coverage determinations and the need to preserve the scientific integrity of
national coverage policy rendered the procedures required by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) unnecessary.' Congress also
required courts to remand contested national coverage policies to
the Secretary of the DHHS for amplification of the record.4 1
Courts have generally upheld HCFA national coverage determinations, according great deference to DHHS and its expert decisionmaking process. 42 However, in 1987, the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended changes regarding the
35 See generally Timothy P. Blanchard, "MedicalNecessity" Denials as a MedicarePart B
Cost-Containment Strategy: Two Wrongs Don't Make It Right or Rationa 34 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 939 (1990); Eleanor D. Kinney, National CoveragePolicy Under the MedicareProgram:
Problems and Proposalsfor Change, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 869 (1988); see also generally
LINDA A. BERGTHOLD & WILLIAM M. SAGE, MEDICAL NECESSITY, EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT AND COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: LESSONS FROM NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM (Oct. 1994); Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of

Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992).
36 HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN, MEDICARE COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL (HCFA Pub. 6)
(1995) reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
27,201 (1995).
37 Proposed Rule, Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical
Services Coverage Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg.
4302 (proposed Jan. 30, 1989).
38 General Notice, Medicare Program; National Coverage Decisions, 54 Fed. Reg.
34,555 (1989).
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
40 H.R. Rep. No. 1012, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 350-51 (1986). But see National Coverage Determinations under the Medicare Program, 1 C.F.R §§ 305.87-8 (1993); see also
generally Kinney, National Coverage Policy, supra note 2.
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b) (3) (C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
42 See, e.g., Fiedrich v. Secretary of HHS, 894 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
that the DHHS is charged with establishing national standards to ensure uniformity
and equality in the administration of medicare and upholding the Secretary's coverage determination); Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing
that the Secretary of DHHS may regulate the Medicare program by enacting regulations concerning Medicare reimbursement); Wilkins v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir. 1989) (deferring to the DHHS Secretary's authority to interpret Medicare
statutes).
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procedures for making national coverage policy as well as judicial
43
review of national coverage policy.

B. Some Important History
When Congress and the Johnson Administration enacted the
Medicare program in 1965,"1 they deliberately maintained the feefor-service payment system for all providers out of the concern that
the health care providers in the Medicare program would otherwise be unwilling to participate in the Medicare program.4 5 Indeed, the opening section of the Social Security Amendments of
1965 explicitly provided:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize any federal
officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over
the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided, or the selection, tenure, or compensation of
any officer or employee of any institution, agency, or person
providing health services; or to exercise any supervision or control over the administration or operation of any such institution,
agency, or person.4 6
Congress specified that hospitals would be paid the "reasonable cost of covered services" according to principles used by private insurance companies.4 7 The Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (DHEW) used the principles of cost reimbursement that Blue Cross and Blue Shield had developed for payment of hospitals under their programs.4 The only additional
requirement that Congress imposed was that hospitals conduct
"utilization review" of their care of Medicare patients.4 9
Although a comparatively mild requirement by modern stan43 See National Coverage Determinations Under the Medicare Program, supra note
40, § 305.87-8 (recommending changes regarding coverage and reimbursement); see
also generally Kinney, National Coverage Policy, supra note 2.

44 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291, (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

45 See ROBERTJ. MYERS, MEDICARE 1-84 (1970) (reviewing the legislative history of
the Medicare program and the compromises with the provider community that influenced Medicare program design); JUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE PoLrIIcs OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE 1-5 (1977) (reviewing the rationale for the basic design of
the Medicare program).

46 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining reasonable costs with
regard to covered services).
48 See generally DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, PRINCIPLES OF COST

REIMBURSEMENT (1968).

49 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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dards, this utilization review requirement was controversial.5" It
was imposed, however, because Congress and DHEW were concerned about the inflationary incentives in the Medicare payment
system for hospitals. 5 1 Yet, utilization review was really the first effort of the federal government to impose some type of external
"management" on the care of Medicare beneficiaries that was physician ordered.
The Medicare program had a very indirect relationship with
physicians and, indeed, only paid physicians directly if patients "assigned" their claims to physicians.52 Medicare paid for physicians'
services on the basis of usual and customary charges. 5 This payment system was highly inflationary because it accorded physicians
exclusive authority to determine charges for services along with the
authority to control the volume of services provided to patients.
The Medicare program, along with Medicaid, generated enormous demand for health care services and with this increased demand came sharp and continuing increases in the cost of health
care services. 54 The seriousness of the cost problem surfaced
shortly after the inauguration of the Medicare programs when initial DHEW inflation projections exceeded all expectations.5 5 Since
1970, curbing Medicare program costs has been the predominant
policy issue for the Medicare program.
Congress and DHEW took steps to curb the inflation in Medicare expenditures. In the Social Security Amendments of 1972,56
three important cost containment measures were introduced to
curb health care cost inflation. The first was an expenditure cap
on allowable hospital costs. 5 7 The second was a capital expenditure review program, the so-called Section 1122 program. 5' The
third was the Professional Standards Review Organization (PSRO)
program that established independent organizations of physicians
to review utilization of hospital services for Medicare benefi50 See SYLVIA A. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 115-44 (2d ed. 1976).
51 See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., lsr SESS, REPORT OF THE STAFF,
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID-PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND ALTERNATIVES 17-18 (Comm. Print
1970) [hereinafter MEDICARE AND MEDICAID].
52 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, § 101, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b) (3) (1988)).
53 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b) (3).
54 Gornick et al., supra note 4, at 35-45.
55 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID, supra note 51, at 3-4.
56 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified

as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
57 See 42 U.S.C. §1395x(v) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining reasonable costs).
58 Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 221, 86 Stat. 1386 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-1).
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ciaries. 9 These three programs represent the predominant regulatory approaches for controlling health care expenditures in a feefor-services payment environment: (1) rate-setting; (2) capital expenditure review; and (3) utilization management.
These programs were extremely controversial when implemented in the early 1970s. Perhaps the most controversial-at
least with physicians-was the PSRO program. Immediately upon
implementation, the organized medical profession brought suit to
challenge the constitutionality of the program.6 The program was
finally disbanded in the early 1980s by the Reagan Administration
in conformity with campaign promises that presidential candidate
Ronald Reagan had made to the medical profession. 6
Yet, in 1982, Congress enacted the Peer Review Organization
(PRO) program to oversee utilization under a reformed Medicare
payment system for hospitals.6 2 Congress was simply concerned
that imposing tightened payment methodologies on hospitals-in
advance of moving toward prospective payment of hospitals without regulating utilization of services by Medicare beneficiarieswould generate costly excess services and expenditures for the
Medicare program.6" Like the PSRO program, the PRO program
required the DHHS to contract with physician organizations to review hospital utilization of Medicare beneficiaries. Managed care
for Medicare was unequivocally launched.
In the 1980s, the major policy initiatives and changes for the
Medicare program were payment reform to address undesirable incentives in fee-for-service medicine. In 1983, Congress, with support from the Reagan Administration, enacted the DRG
prospective payment system for hospitals that paid a preset price
based on the patient's diagnosis and medical condition.' Con59 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (creating a utilization review plan).
60 Association of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125
(N.D. Ill. 1975), af'd, 423 U.S. 975 (1975) (finding that the statute establishing the
PSRO program did not bar physicians from practicing their profession and is not so
patently arbitrary and totally lacking in rational justification as to be violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution).
61 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, § 2111, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357, 793 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (1988)).
62 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, §§ 141-50, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
96 Stat. 381 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1988)); see generally Peter E.
Dans et al., Peer Review Organizations: Promises and Potential Pitfalls, 31 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1131 (1985).
63 Peer Review Organizations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate
Comm. On FinancA 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985).
64 Social Security Amendments of 1983 § 601(e), Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww (1988)).
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gress, with support of the Bush Administration, enacted a revised
payment system for physician services in 1989 that paid physicians
based on the time and resources involved in treating specific conditions rather than on a charge basis.6 5
Another important policy development that augmented the
development of managed care was increased emphasis on Medicare coverage policy and quality improvement strategies. In the
early 1980s, health services researchers published important findings in health services research on the effectiveness or "outcomes"
of specific medical procedures.6 6 Responding to these findings
and exhibiting an increased interest in the use of coverage policy
as a means to contain Medicare program cost and improve the
quality and effectiveness of care accorded Medicare beneficiaries,
DHHS launched a health services research initiative to expand research on outcomes of care.6 7
In 1989, Congress charged the newly-created Agency for
Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) to support outcomes
research on outcomes of specific medical procedures, and sponsor
development of medical practice guidelines based on this research. 68 Third-party payers have used outcomes research on costly
and widely-used medical procedures to define the content of medically necessary and appropriate care through development of medical practice guidelines, clinical standards, and quality assurance
measures. The theory behind using outcomes research in this way
is that cost savings can be achieved and quality improved by limiting coverage of health care services that do not have a significant
impact on health outcomes. 69 HCFA and carriers are also becom65 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 § 6102, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103
Stat. 2111, 2169 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a) (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
66 See generally Robert H. Brook & Kathleen N. Lohr, Efficacy, Effectiveness, Variations, and Quality-Boundary-CrossingResearch, 23 MED. CARE 710 (1985); Mark R. Chassin, Standards of Care in Medicine, 25 INQUIRY 437 (1988); David M. Eddy, Variations in
Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, 3 HEALTH AFF. 74 (Summer 1984); John E.
Wennberg, Commentary: On Patient Need, Equity, Supplier-InducedDemand, and the Need
to Assess the Outcomes of Common Medical Procedures,23 MED. CARE 512 (1985); John E.
Wennberg, Dealingwith MedicalPracticeVariations: A Proposalfor Action, 3 HEALTH AFF.
6 (1984).
67 See generally William L. Roper, M.D., et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve Medical PracticA 319 NEw. ENG.J. MED. 1197 (1988).
68 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 6103, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103
Stat. 2106, 2189 (1989) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 299 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
69 See generally David M. Eddy &John Billings, The Quality of MedicalEvidence: Implicationsfor Quality of Care, 7 HEAmTH AFF. 19 (Spring 1988); John E. Wennberg, Improving the Medical Decision-MakingProcess, 7 HEALTH An-. 99 (Spring 1988); see also Arnold

1996]

MEDICARE MANAGED CARE

1173

ing more sophisticated in the use of medical practice guidelines,
often based on DHHS funded outcomes research, to make scientifically-based coverage policy that may result in limits on coverage of
certain medical procedures for Medicare beneficiaries. 7 °
III.

MEDICARE MANAGED CARE

HCFA has long promoted managed care for its beneficiaries
and, indeed, as discussed above, was in the forefront of developing
managed care techniques. 71 Movement toward managed care became a central theme of the Medicare program in the early 1980s.
Clearly, the major theme of the regulatory approaches to cost containment, such as payment reform as well as tighter management
of utilization and coverage policy were based on the theory that
Medicare payment and coverage policies that simply affirmed physician decisions to order covered services was at the heart of the
cost inflation problem in the Medicare program. Medicare program managers and Congress have viewed managed care as a major means of controlling such physician autonomy and its costly
ramifications.
For reasons discussed below, 72 Congress and Medicare pro-

gram managers have not acted with similar speed or enthusiasm
toward moving Medicare beneficiaries into capitated HMOs or
managed care plans. Such efforts were among the least developed
initiatives of the current Medicare program. It is useful to speculate about the rationale for this hesitancy. It may be a belief among
Medicare program managers as well as Medicare beneficiaries and
their providers that HMOs may not serve well a population that has
a high incidence of chronic disease and disability.
A.

The History of HMOs and Capitated Health Plansfor Medicare
Beneficiaries

As indicated above, the Medicare program has always been
and remains somewhat schizophrenic about HMOs and capitated
health plans for Medicare beneficiaries. In the early years of Medicare, Congress and Medicare program managers were nervous
M. Epstein, The Outcomes Movement - Will It Get Us Where We Want to Got, 323 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 266 (1990) (discussing the viability of using outcomes research to develop standards of medical treatment).
70 See generally Colleen M. Grogan et al., How Will We Use Clinical Guidelines? The
Experience of Medicare Carriers, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 7 (1994).
71 See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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about HMOs for Medicare beneficiaries. 7 Even after research
demonstrated that HMOs were a more efficient and cost-effective
vehicle for providing medical care 74 and that Medicare was facing
extraordinary cost inflation,75 Medicare program managers and
Congress were hesitant about HMOs.
In the 1960s and 1970s, congressmen from both sides of the
aisle and particularly the Senate Finance Committee were concerned that the incentives for HMOs to curtail service would result
in underservice to Medicare beneficiaries and enrollment of only
healthy beneficiaries. 76 Indeed, for the most part, HMOs could
only serve beneficiaries if they did so on a fee-for-service basis.7 7
1.

Key Legislative Enactments

In 1972, in a major health initiative of the Nixon administration, Congress passed the Federal HMO Act to promote the development of capitated health care delivery for the non-elderly
population.78 One year earlier, Congress had also authorized a
very restrictive capitation payment arrangement for HMOs serving
Medicare beneficiaries. 79 This arrangement was so unattractive to
HMOs that only two HMOs actually contracted with HCFA to serve
Medicare beneficiaries on this basis.8 0
In the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA), Congress authorized HCFA to contract with qualified
HMOs and "competitive medical plans" (CMPs) and pay them on a
capitated basis.8" TEFRA defined HMOs, for purposes of the Medicare program, as meeting the requirements of the Federal HMO
73 See generallyJohnK. Iglehart, Medicare Turns toHMOs, 312 NEw ENG.J. MED. 132,
132-33 (1985) (discussing the movement to "marry Medicare with HMOs").
74 See generally Sheldon Greenfield et al., Variations in Resource Utilization Among
Medical Specialties and Systems of Care: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 267 JAMA
1624 (1992).
75 See supra notes 12-14, 54-55 and accompanying text.
76 See generally Iglehart, supra note 73.
77 Id. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
78 Federal Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87
Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(e) et seq. (1988)).
79 See Social Security Amendments of 1972, § 226, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat.
1329, 1396 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)); see Iglehart, supra note 73, at 133.
80 See Iglehart, supra note 73, at 133.
81 Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 114, 96 Stat. 324, 341 (1982) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1395mm (1988)). In addition, pursuant to this authority, HCFA authorized
health care prepayment plans (HCPPs) which could provide Part B services to beneficiaries on a prepaid basis. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.800-.838 (1995). HCFA then would
pay HCPPs on a cost reimbursement basis. Id. § 417.800(c).
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Act 2 for federally qualified HMOs.83 CMPs are simply capitated
managed care plans that are not federally qualified HMOs under
the Federal HMO Act.84 The requirements for CMPs are less stringent, but must provide specified physician and other services, outof-area coverage, and inpatient hospital services.85
HMOs and CMPs qualified to serve Medicare beneficiaries
must meet federal statutory, regulatory, and contract requirements. One of the most important of. these requirements is that
Medicare HMOs must, with some exceptions, serve at least 5,000
individuals of which 75% are Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare
HMOs must also offer the full complement of Medicare services
and meet other requirements, including having comprehensive
and publicized grievance and appeal procedures.86
Specifically, Congress authorized HCFA to enter into three
types of contracts with Medicare HMOs-risk contracts which typically use capitated payment methods, cost contracts, and health
care prepayment plans.87 Since 1982, Medicare has had the authority to pay for services for its beneficiaries on a capitated basis in
its Medicare HMO Risk Contractor Program.88 Under a risk contract, the HMO is paid a capitated payment per patient and assumes the financial risk for the care of that patient.89 To calculate
the capitated rate, HCFA uses the Adjusted Average Per Capita
Cost (AAPCC) which reflects the average cost of providing services
to a Medicare beneficiary as adjusted for age, sex, welfare status,
institutionalization, and geographic area.9" HCFA sets the AAPCC
annually and publishes the rate in the FederalRegister.91
It is important to emphasize that risk-based Medicare HMOs
cannot retain savings achieved through efficiencies but, rather,
42 U.S.C. § 300d-9(d) (1988).
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, § 114 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1395mm(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
84 Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(e) et
seq. (1988)).
85 See 42 C.F.R. § 417.407(c) (1995).
86 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.600-.638 (1995).
87 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395mm & 1 (1988); see HEALTH PLAN REQUIREMENTS GUIDE FOR
MANAGED CARE AND OTHER HEALTH PLANs, at 1200:3 (Atlantic Information Servs.,
Inc., Nov. 1995).
88 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
89 42 C.F.R. § 417.584(a) (1995).
90 Id. § 417.401; Susan J. Stayn, Securing Access to Care in Health MaintenanceOrganizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures,94 COLUM. L. REv.
1674, 1685 (1994).
91 42 C.F.R. § 417.401; see Stayn, supra note 90, at 1685 (explaining the risk and
cost contracts and calculation of payments for both types).
82
83
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must use these savings to enhance benefits for Medicare beneficiaries.9 2 Congress mandated this approach out of concerns that,
otherwise, HMOs would cut corners in the care of Medicare HMO
enrollees.9" Consequently, Medicare risk-based HMOs and CMPs,
while accomplishing some savings, have not achieved savings comparable to private capitated health plans.9 4
In 1986, Congress also imposed prohibitions on the ability of
HMOs and CMPs to provide financial incentives to physicians to
limit services to enrollees.9 5 At this time, Congress also strengthened the consumer protection provisions for Medicare enrollees in
HMOs and CMPs.9 6
2.

The Mixed Track Record of Medicare HMOs

The track record of HMOs under the Medicare program after
1982 has been mixed. HCFA demonstrations testing the experience of Medicare beneficiaries in HMOs with risk contracts reported generally satisfactory performance by risk-based Medicare
HMOs. 97 One demonstration found little difference in the actual
experience of beneficiaries in traditional fee-for-service care and
Medicare HMOs, although beneficiaries in HMOs reported less
confidence in the quality of HMO physicians.9" Research also
demonstrated considerable satisfaction with HMOs among Medicare beneficiaries as well as increasingly high levels of quality
care.

99

Yet, in the 1980s, Medicare beneficiaries expressed dissatisfaction with Medicare HMOs and particularly coverage decisions
made by Medicare HMOs. Specifically, Network Design Group
(NDG), the private contractor that handles reconsiderations of
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (regulating use of savings).
See Iglehart, supra note 73, at 132-33.
Congressional Budget Office, Managed Care and the Medicare Program, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
43,208 (Apr. 26, 1995).
95 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, § 9313(c), Pub. L. No. 99-509,
100 Stat. 1874, 2002 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1988)) (prohibiting financial incentives aimed at limiting services to program participants).
96 See id. § 9312, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874, 1999 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1320mm (1988) (providing consumer protection).
97 See generally Sheldon M. Retchin et al., How the Elderly Fare in HMOs: Outcomes
from the Medicare CompetitionDemonstrations,27 HEALTH SERViCES REs. 652 (1992); Gregory R. Nycz et al., Medicare Risk Contracting: Lessons from an Unsuccessful Demonstration,
257JAMA 656 (1987).
98 See Retchin et al., supra note 97.
99 See generally Louis F. Rossiter et al., PatientSatisfaction Among Elderly Enrollees and
Disenrollees in Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations: Resultsfrom the National Medicare Competition Evaluation, 262 JAMA 57 (1989); Retchin et al., supra note 97.
92
93
94
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HMO determinations in grievance procedures, recently reported
that a major source of beneficiary dissatisfaction was coverage disputes and noted that many enrollees who appealed coverage disputes to NDG disenrolled from Medicare HMOs shortly
thereafter.10 0 DHHS data reports that almost one in three Medicare beneficiaries in HMOs disenroll within two years. 0 1
Also, during the late 1980s, several large HMOs exhibited serious problems with respect to quality of care and consumer satisfaction which attracted considerable media and political attention. 2
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) expressed
concern about the rapid expansion of the Medicare HMO program and the capacity of HCFA to adequately monitor Medicare
HMOs.10 3 During this period, Congress and HCFA were also concerned about HMO incentive payments to physicians and their effect on quality of care.' 0 4 As noted, Congress forbade such
incentive payments to physicians. 0 5
In 1991, the GAO issued a report about the serious problems
with large HMOs as well as continued problems with Medicare
HMOs and the quality of care they provide to Medicare beneficiaries.10 6 Congressional hearings and reports revealed similar
concerns. 0 7 In 1993, the Administrator of HCFA publicly an100 Stayn, supra note 90, at 1687 & n.91 (citing

DAVID

A. RICHARDSON, NETWORK

DESIGN GROUP, INC., A STUDY OF COVERAGE DENIAL DIsPUTES BETWEEN MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES AND HMOs 2, 62 (1993)).
101 Id. & n.90 (citing Louis W. SULIUVAN, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DISENROLLMENT EXPERIENCE IN THE MEDICARE HMO AND
TO 1988 FINAL REPORT ii, 43 (1990)).
102 See generallyJohn K. Iglehart, Second Thoughts About

CMP

RISK PROGRAM:

1985

HMOs for Medicare Patients,

316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1487 (1987).
103

See U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPERIENCE SHOWS WAYS TO IMPROVE

No. HRD-88-73 (Aug. 18, 1988),
reprinted in Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 37,242 (1988) (noting the rapid
expansion of the Medicare HMO program and questioning the ability of the HCFA to
effectively oversee the program).
104 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PAYMENTS BY PREPAID HEALTH PLANS CouLD LOWER QUALrry OF CARE (GAO/HRD-89-29)
(Dec. 1988).
105 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: HCFA NEEDS TO TAKE
OVERSIGHT OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS,

STRONGER ACTIONS AGAINST

HMOs

VIOLATING FEDERAL STANDARDS

(GAO/HRD-92-

11) (Nov. 12, 1991), reprinted in Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 1 39,742
(1992).
107 See, e.g., Medicare HMOs and Quality Assurance: Unfulfilled Promises: Hearings before
the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Medicare
HMOs and Quality Assurance]; Medicare HMO Risk-ContractorProgram: Hearings before the
House Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter MedicareHMO Risk-ContractorProgram]; MINORrY STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM.
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nounced that HCFA was not encouraging Medicare beneficiaries
08
to enroll in Medicare HMOs because of quality concerns.1
3.

Beneficiary Enrollment in Medicare HMO and Capitated
Health Plans

The enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in HMOs capitated
health plans over the course of the program has reflected the early
ambivalence about capitated health plans for Medicare benefi•ciaries as well as market trends. In 1985, fewer than one million
Medicare beneficiaries had enrolled in Medicare HMOs. 1°9 In recent years, the number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in
HMOs has grown considerably from 883,000 (2.9%) in 1984 to
2,238,000 (6.3%) in 1992.110 An estimated 150 managed care organizations contracted with HCFA in 1995 which constituted a 40%
increase from the previous year."'
It is important to appreciate that this movement of Medicare
beneficiaries toward HMOs and capitated health plans is taking
place without federal legislation. The movement has now taken on
dramatic dimensions and it is likely that a significant proportion of
Medicare beneficiaries will receive health care through capitated
health plans irrespective of federal legislation. Consequently, it is
crucial to revisit the procedural protections that are now in place
as well as those proposed in bills before Congress for Medicare
beneficiaries.
B.

Provisionsfor ProtectingMedicare HMO Enrollees

There are essentially two key procedural protections for enrollees in an HMO or other capitated health plan." 2 First are publication of the benefits, coverage policies, enrollment, and other
procedures in a comprehensible and accessible form. Second are
grievance and appeal procedures for enrollees to adjudicate and
resolve individual disputes with the plan.
ON AGING, 100 CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICARE AND HMOs:
TURBING FINDINGS (Comm. Print 1987).

A FIRST LOOK, WITH Dis-

108 Robert Pear, Medicare to Stop Pushing Patients to Enter H.M.O.s, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 1993, at Al.
109 Iglehart, supra note 73, at 133.
110 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, supra note 7, at 24.
111 Beth Freeman, The Financialand OperationalMechanics of MedicareRisk Contract,2
CAPITATION & RISK CONTRACTING 1, 1 (Dec. 1995); see also Randall S. Brown et al., Do
Health Maintenance OrganizationsWork for Medicare?, 15 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 7, 7-23
(1993).
112 See generally Kinney, ProceduralProtectionsfor Consumers, supra note 2 (discussing
Medicare capitation).
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Medicare HMO Publication Procedures

Medicare HMOs and CMPs must provide adequate written descriptions of rules, procedures, benefits, fees and other charges, services
and information to beneficiaries.1 1 Further, HMOs cannot distribute marketing materials and application forms without HCFA
approval. 114 Congress added considerably to these publication requirements in 1986 to further protection of Medicare
beneficiaries. 1 5
2. Medicare HMO Grievance and Appeal Procedures
The Medicare statute requires Medicare HMOs to have an appeals process.1 16 HCFA has promulgated detailed regulations outlining these appeal procedures. 1 7 All Medicare HMOs must
maintain "internal grievance procedures" described in written
membership rules and clearly explained upon enrollment, involuntary disenrollment, or individual request. Appealable issues include denials of medical treatment within the HMO, authorization
for outside referrals for supposedly covered services, and payment
for emergency, urgent, or other care received outside the HMO.
An HMO must notify a beneficiary of an adverse organization determination within sixty days. The notice must state the specific
reasons for the determination and inform of the right to reconsideration. This determination is final and binding unless
reconsidered.
When a reconsideration is requested, the HMO issues the final
determination if it is favorable to the enrollee. If the HMO recommends a partial or complete affirmation of its original adverse determination, it must prepare a written explanation of its decision
and send the entire file to HCFA. NDG, an outside contractor,
handles reconsiderations on behalf of HCFA. HCFA contracted
with NDG in 1989 following a lawsuit challenging the delays that
many beneficiaries experienced with HCFA's handling of reconsideration requests."18
The Medicare statute makes express provision for the judicial
review of beneficiaries' disputes with HMOs. If the amount in controversy is $100 or more, the disappointed party may appeal to a
113 42 C.F.R. § 417.428 (1995).
114 Id.
115
116
117
118

1989).

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(c)(5) (1988 & Supp. V); see Stayn, supra note 90, at 1691.

42 C.F.R. § 417.600-.638 (1995).
Levy v. Bowen, No. 88-3271 DT, 1989 WL 136292, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 20,
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Social Security Administration Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
The HMO must be a party to the hearing but may not request a
hearing. 1 9 The beneficiary or HMO may request an Appeals
Council review of the ALJ's decision as well as judicial review if the
amount in controversy exceeds $1000.12 ° This is essentially the system for administrative and judicial review that is available for other
Medicare beneficiary disputes. 121
3.

Problems with Current Medicare HMO Procedural
Protections

There have been indications of problems with HMO grievance
and appeal procedures. In two congressional hearings,' consumers leveled extensive complaints about the operation of grievance
procedures in HMOs. Specifically, there are several important issues regarding regularity and timeliness of appeals. These include:
denials of payment for treatment by outside providers and/or
emergency or urgently needed care; and inpatient care issues such
as unauthorized postemergency care or pressure to discharge patients whom the HMO or its utilization reviewer believes no longer
1 23
need hospital level care.
There have been two lawsuits challenging Medicare HMO appeal procedures. In Levy v. Sullivan,12 4 HCFA entered a settlement
25
agreement to improve timeliness and notice in reconsiderations.1
12
6
More recently, in Grijalva v. Shalala, a federal district court certified a national class in a lawsuit alleging serious deficiencies in the
Medicare HMO grievance and appeal procedures. This claim alleges that DHHS failed to monitor and sanction risk-based HMOs
that failed to implement effective notice, appeals, or a contemporaneous hearing procedure for HMO service denials. Most individual claimants allege that the HMO failed to provide timely
notification of the denial or that the notice, when given, inade42 C.F.R. §§ 417.630-.632 (1995).
Id. §§ 417.634-.636.
See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, The MedicareAppeals System for Payment and Coverage Disputes, 1 ADmiN. L.J. 1 (1986) (discussing the appeals system).
122 Medicare HMOs and Quality Assurance, supra note 107; MedicareHMO Risk-Contractor Program, supra note 107.
123 Stayn, supra note 90, at 1685-87; see, e.g., Probstein v. Sullivan, No. Civ. H-90-18
(PCD), 1992 WL 309932 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 1993); Pulleyblank v. Sullivan, No. 9105051 (GAG), 1992 WL 163291 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 1992).
124 No. 88-3271 DT, 1989 WL 265476 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 1989).
125 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
126 Civ. No. 93-711 TUC ACM, 1995 WL 523609 (D. Ariz. Jul. 18, 1995).
119
120
121
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quately stated the reason. Additionally, the claimants complain of
insufficient notice of appeal rights and ineffective appeals process.
The subject of coverage and adequate procedures to appeal
coverage denials is a difficult issue with respect to HMOs and managed care plans. 12 7 As cost concerns increase, HMOs and managed
care plans may well be under great pressure to make restrictive coverage decisions in the care of Medicare beneficiaries. Further,
beneficiaries may not recognize these coverage decisions as such
because they are often couched in physicians' clinical decisions
and will not be presented in the context of a claim as occurs under
traditional fee-for-service medical care. It is crucial to revisit Medicare appeal procedures for both Part B and Medicare HMOs to
ensure that beneficiaries have adequate procedures to challenge
coverage denials in managed care systems.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE

PROPoSALS: FROM MEDICARE TO

CAPITATED

MANAGED CARE

The 1990s have seen unprecedented congressional interest in
the reform of the health care system from across the ideological
spectrum.1 28 President Clinton introduced the Health Security Act
of 1993129 to provide comprehensive health reform based on principles of managed competition.1 3 0 Several senators and members
of Congress introduced health reform bills as well.1"1 One bill to
establish a single-payer system would have expanded the Medicare
program to cover all Americans.1 3 2 In most bills before the 103d
Congress, the Medicare program was essentially unchanged. 3

The President and congressmen were concerned that undue tam13
pering with the Medicare program would anger elderly voters. 1
With the election of Republican majorities in the House and
Senate in 1994, the health reform landscape changed dramatically.
Proposals for comprehensive health reform were long forgotten.
The Republican Congress turned to the Medicare program as a

way to meet its paramount goal of balancing the federal budget in
127 See generally Kinney, Resolving Consumer Grievances, supra note 2; Kinney, Procedural Protectionsfor Consumers, supra note 2; Kinney, ProtectingConsumers and Providers,

supra note 2.
128 See Kinney, ProtectingConsumers and Providers, supra note 2, at 83-89.
129 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
130 See generally Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principlesof Managed Competition,
12 HEALTH Arr. 24 (Supp. 1993).
131 Kinney, Protecting Consumers and Pmviders, supra note 2, at 83-86.
132 See H.I. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
133 See Kinney, ProtectingConsumers and Providers, supra note 2, at 114-16.
13 See id.
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seven years. All proposals before the 104th Congress would move
35
Medicare beneficiaries toward capitated managed care plans.

A.

The Republican Proposal
The Republican proposal, the Medicare Preservation Act of

1995,136 would contain a number of incentives for Medicare benefi-

ciaries to enroll in capitated health plans while leaving open the
option, albeit more expensive, to remain in traditional fee-for-service care. The bill also contains a radical proposal for MedicarePlus plans which would enable Medicare beneficiaries to
obtain health insurance through the private market in capitated
37
health plans.1

MedicarePlus plans can be quite varied in design and may offer a medical savings account feature through which beneficiaries
can retain savings if all account funds are not used for medical
expenditures.1 3 Also MedicarePlus plans can be sponsored by a
variety of organizations that provide health coverage in the private
market.3 9 The Secretary of DHHS is responsibile for certifying
plans and may do so in conjunction with comparable state
40

programs. 1

The Secretary of DHHS is also responsibile for developing
standards for MedicarePlus organizations.1 4 1 In so doing, the Secretary must consult with the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC).142 Further, the Secretary must initiate a
negotiated rulemaking process to develop these standards through
1 43
a consensus of affected parties.

The Republican proposal places great emphasis on publication of information about the plans. The Secretary would be responsible for broadly disseminating information to current and
prospective Medicare beneficiaries on the coverage options avail135 See generally Beth C. Fuchs et al., Medicare: the Restructuring Debate, CRS ISSUE
BRIEF, Order Code IB95108 (1995); THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, MEDICARE REFORM: A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND GUIDE TO THE ISSUES (1995).
136 H.R. 2425, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). For an excellent review of the Repub-

lican Medicare proposal, see generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUMMARY
OF THE MEDICARE PRESERVATION ACT OF 1995 (1995).
137 See H.R. 2524, § 15001 (creating Social Security Act [hereinafter SSA]
§ 1805(a)).
138 See id. § 15011
139 See id. § 15002 (creating SSA §§ 1851 & 1854).
140 Id. (creating SSA § 1857).
141 Id. (creating SSA § 1856).
142 Id. (creating SSA § 1856(a)(1)).
143 Id. (creating SSA § 1856(c)(1)).
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able in order to encourage informed selection.' 4 4 The Secretary
would be required to provide, at a minimum: (1) an information
booklet during coverage election periods which includes standardized information regarding premiums, quality (including customer
satisfaction), beneficiary rights, and responsibilities; (2) a toll-free
number for inquiries; and (3) information 5in the Medicare Hand14
book regarding the MedicarePlus option.
The legislation would create a new congressional commission,
the Medicare Payment Review Commission, to review and make
recommendations to Congress concerning payment policies. 4 6
The Secretary of DHHS would be required to respond to Commission recommendations in an informal rulemaking process. 14 7 The
Commission would be responsible for determining the following:
the appropriateness of payment methodologies and risk adjustment factors for MedicarePlus plans; the implications of risk selections; development and implementation of quality assurance
strategies for MedicarePlus plans and the impact of MedicarePlus
plans in beneficiary access to care."4 The Commission would also
have the responsibility of reviewing payment policies for fee-forservice providers under Parts A and B of the Medicare program. 149
This Commission would replace the congressional commissions
that now review Medicare hospital and physician payment policies.
Each MedicarePlus organization would have to provide for
meaningful procedures for hearing and resolving grievances between the organization (and entities and individuals through
which it provides services) and enrollees. 5 Regarding appeals of
coverage determinations, each MedicarePlus organization would
have to make determinations regarding authorization requests for
nonemergency care on a timely basis.15 ' Medical necessity decisions could only be made by a physician.' 52 Appeals of a determination would be required within thirty to sixty days of receiving
1 53
relevant medical information.
An enrollee dissatisfied by reason of the enrollee's failure to
receive health services would be entitled, if the amount in contro144

Id. (creating SSA § 1805(d) (1)).

145 Id. (creating SSA § 1805(d) (3)).
146 Id. § 15031.
'47

Id. (creating SSA §1806(b) (1) (D)).

148 Id. (creating SSA § 1806(b) (2)).
149 Id. (creating SSA §1806(a)(4)).

Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
150

§ 15002 (creating SSA § 1853(f)(1)).
(creating SSA § 1853(e) (1)).
(creating SSA §1883(e) (2) (B)).
(creating SSA § 1853(e) (2) (A)).
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versy was $100 or more, to a hearing before the Secretary."' If the
amount in controversy was $1,000 or more, the individual or organization, upon notifying the other party, would be entitled to judicial review.15 5 The Secretary would be required to contract with an
independent, outside entity to review and resolve appeals of denials of coverage related to urgent or emergency services with respect
to MedicarePlus products.1 5 6
The Republican proposal also sharply reduces federal expenditures for the Medicare program through increased cost sharing on
the part of Medicare beneficiaries-particularly for those opting to
receive care from fee-for-service Medicare providers and not
through a MedicarePlus plan.1 5 7 These reductions and incentives
have raised the most serious concerns among advocates and
58
providers.1
The chief concern is that the Republican proposal will encourage more healthy beneficiaries to opt for MedicarePlus plans.
On the other hand, sicker and disabled beneficiaries with established relationships with providers will opt for the traditional feefor-service Medicare program. The concern is that sicker beneficiaries will be squeezed with the larger cost-sharing requirements
of fee-for-service approaches and that federal expenditures for this
component of the program will increase at greater rates than expenditures for the MedicarePlus component. 5 9 While the American Medical Association ultimately supported the Republican
proposal upon gaining concessions with respect to fraud and
abuse, antitrust, and malpractice provisions, the American College
of Physicians has launched a formal program to lobby against the
Republican proposal because of these concerns. 16 °

Id. (creating SSA § 1853(f)(2)).
Id.
156 Id. (creating SSA § 1853(f)(3)).
157 Id. §§ 15611-12.
158 Medicare: Perspectives on the Past and Implicationsfor the Future: Hearing on S. 104266 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Dr.
Gail Wilensky, Senior Fellow, Project Hope, Bethesda, MD); Medicare Provisionsin the
President'sBudget: Hearing on S. 104-31 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statements of Thomas A. Scully,
President and CEO, Federation of American Health Systems, andJake Hansen, Director of Government Affairs, The Seniors Coalition).
159 See Statement of Marilyn Moon, supra note 9; Statement of Bruce Vladeck, supra
note 9.
160 Letter from Gerald E. Thompson, President, to American College of Physician
Colleagues (Aug. 15, 1995).
154

155
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President Clinton's Proposal

President Clinton's proposal to reform Medicare has not been
reduced to a bill but, rather, remains in specifications for legislation. 6 1 Like the Republican bill, the President's proposal would
expand options for Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in managed
care plans. 162 Further, program design should ensure that benefits, quality, and access will be comparable to current plan and that
out-of-pocket expenditures will be-no more than for fee-for-service
63
Medicare.1
Plan beneficiaries are to be protected from financial instability
of the plan or provider. They should have access to timely and fair
resolution of appeals, grievances, and complaints. Beneficiaries
are to have access to comprehensive, understandable information
about plans, including basic policies and procedures, consumer
satisfaction, and plan performance." Beneficiaries are not to be
coerced into any plan or prevented from enrolling in the plan of
their choice due to health status. Medical records and claims information should be protected. Purchasers of services for beneficiaries will be accountable for the monitoring of these
protections. 165
The President's proposal contains no express provisions pertaining to grievance procedures. Presumably, beneficiaries would
66
use existing procedures.
V.

PROTECTING MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES IN MANAGED

CARE PLANS
As Medicare moves toward capitated managed care in an era
of budget reductions, it is crucial to understand the ways to protect
the legitimate interests of Medicare beneficiaries in getting high
quality medical care. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to critique substantively the legislative proposals currently
before Congress, it is crucial to appreciate that the ultimate protection of Medicare beneficiaries comes from a well-designed
program.
To that end, design incentives-such as those in the Republican legislative proposal-that promote segmentation of more
161 See PRESIDENT'S MEDICARE PROPOSAL

(Draft 1995).

162 See id.
163 See id.
164

16
16

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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healthy beneficiaries into capitated plans while forcing more ill
beneficiaries to remain in fee-for-service plans with greater cost
sharing are undesirable. Further, design incentives should not
freeze a minimum level of public contribution for services with the
expectation that beneficiaries wanting more services or a higher
level of quality of care should purchase such care independently.
Such a design approach could well lead to a lean program for
poorer beneficiaries while more affluent beneficiaries, who have
the requisite clout to articulate the concerns of beneficiaries in the
political arena, could opt out over time. Quite simply, a welldesigned program should contain design incentives that prevent
segmentation of the Medicare population between the sick and the
healthy as well as the rich and the poor.
Nevertheless, procedural protections are important. To that
end, revisiting first principles of administrative law may be instructive in dealing with new challenges of protecting beneficiaries of a
government program in a new age and, specifically, in ensuring
accountability of the stewards of the Medicare program and the
16 7
capitated health plans with which they contract to provide care.
The protections accorded by rule and policy-making, adjudication,
and judicial review are key processes in ensuring such
accountability.
A.

Medicare ProgramPolicy-making

The Federal Constitution accords little protection to beneficiaries of a government health insurance program in terms of defining the content of benefits since the Supreme Court has clearly
established that an interest in health care services is not a constitutionally protected interest. 68 Beneficiaries can only look to statutes for the delineation of a legally protected interest in health
care service.
167 See generally Marc A. Rodwin, Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What Are the
Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. (1996).
168 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the funding restrictions
in the Hyde Amendment to the Social Security Act do not violate the First or Fifth
Amendments); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause does not require a participating state in Medicare program to fund services
incident to nontherapuetic abortion where state chooses to fund childbirth); see generallyJames Blumstein, Distinguishing Government's Responsibility in RationingPublic and
Private MedicalResources, 60 TEX. L. REv. 899 (1982); James Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutiona4Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345 (1981);
Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal"Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L.
REv. 1401 (1981); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care Through Market
Mechanism: A Response to ProfessorBlumstein, 60 TEX. L. REv. 919 (1982).
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Consequently, statutory definitions of benefits and their
amount, duration, and scope are critical, though not dispositive.
The Medicare statute clearly lists benefits which remain essentially
the same under all reform proposals. 6 9 Perhaps more important
are statutory definitions and, more particularly, standards governing coverage of benefits. As indicated above, 170 coverage can
be an extremely flexible concept, particularly when interpreted in
the context of capitated health plans. The details of amount, duration, and scope of services are probably best delineated in manuals
1 71
and other nonlegislative program guidance as HCFA now does.
The statute should still enunciate standards for coverage that
are enforceable in court when not followed by program administrators or their contractors. Currently, the major statutory standards
for coverage are "reasonable and necessary" for the diagnosis and
treatment of disease and injury.172 As indicated above, even these
173
general standards of coverage have been controversial.
A statutory coverage standard alone is not sufficient to ensure
that Medicare will pay only for necessary services while protecting
the interests of beneficiaries of those services. The policy or standard must also be enforced in good faith without seeking to accomplish other goals such as cost containment.
The controversy over coverage policy for home health services
in the late 1980s is a case in point. HCFA, to curve the sharply
escalating costs of home health care for the Medicare program,
instructed fiscal intermediaries to the statutory requirements that
home health care be provided on an intermittent basis.1 74 Fiscal
intermediaries began denying claims for home health services on a
retroactive basis, raising cries of unfairness among home health
1 75
agencies and Medicare beneficiaries.
In response, Congress
176
held numerous hearings.
See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
171 See Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System, supra note 2, at 9-10.
172 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
174 See Kinney, In Search of BureaucraticJustice, supra note 2, at 254 (offering a background of the Medicare Home Health Benefit).
175 Id. at 259-68.
176 See, e.g., Home Health Care: The Agony of Indifference: Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm., 100 Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); HOUSE SELEcr Comm. ON AGING, THE ATTEMPTED DISMANTLING OF THE MEDICARE HOME CARE BENEFIT: A REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986).
169
170
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Ultimately, in Duggan v. Bowen,' 77 home health agency advocates, Medicare beneficiaries, home health agencies, and several
members of Congress filed suit claiming constitutional and statutory violations in HCFA's execution of coverage policy for Medicare home health benefits. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.1 7 The lawsuit was settled when HCFA agreed to revise its coverage policy in
program manuals to be less restrictive and accord greater flexibility
to fiscal intermediaries in applying coverage standards.' 7 9 Following this revision of coverage policy, Medicare expenditures for
home health care increased sharply and now constitutes one of the
fastest growing categories of Medicare spending. 8 0
The lesson from this experience is that statutory coverage standards are not able to serve as cost-containment vehicles because,
when applied restrictively, they unduly curtail discretion and harm
beneficiaries. The stewards of the Medicare program appreciate
this fact and, thus, have pushed for the development of coverage
policy that more clearly reflects the consensus of the medical and
scientific community as to efficacy of specific services and treatment modalities. 8 Further, other cost containment strategies are
needed, such as altering retrospective cost- or charged-based payment policies, to change the tendency of providers to maximize
the amount of services provided to individual beneficiaries. HCFA
has moved to prospective payment systems for most providers to
address such incentives. 18 2 It is considering similar payment re183
forms for home health agencies.
In sum, having statutory coverage standards coupled with coverage policy for specific services that are scientifically based is essential to protect the legitimate interests of beneficiaries. Further,
implementation of coverage policy should not be used as a costcontainment methodology. Rather, HCFA should modify payment
methodologies to address cost-containment concerns. To be sure
that coverage policy is scientifically based and reflects the consen177 691 F. Supp. 1487 (D.D.C. 1988).
178 See id. (holding that the Department of Health and Human Services interpretation of part-time or intermittent care contravened statute which specifically excluded
only full-time care from coverage).
179 See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEDICARE HoME HEALTH AGENCY MANUAL, at
Transmittal No. 222 (April 1989).
180 Levit et al., supra note 6, at 265.
181 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
183 Bruce E. Vladeck, Ph.D. & Nancy A. Miller, Ph.D., The Medicare Home Health
Initiative, 16 HEALTH Cmm FIN. REv. 7, 12-13 (1994).
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sus of the medical community about the quality of care, coverage
must be made in an open, regular process. HCFA's coverage policy-making process has been criticized as inaccessible and irregular
in the 1980s. 184 In recent years, however, HCFA has publicized
how it makes coverage policy"s5 and this process has generated less
controversy.
Further, research sponsored by HCFA and AHCPR on the efficacy and outcomes of specific medical procedures should be selected and funded in a credible process. Currently, HCFA and
AHCPR use peer review by independent experts to select projects
for funding following open proposal solicitations. The process for
supervising the research that supports Medicare coverage policy
has enjoyed respect and support in the medical and policy
communities.
Another substantive area in which policy and policy-making is
of crucial importance-particularly as Medicare moves to capitated
managed care-is quality assessment and improvement. In Medicare's early years, quality of care was left chiefly to providers and
Medicare relied on private accreditation and state licensure to determine that a particular provider was capable of providing services
of acceptable quality to Medicare beneficiaries.1 8 6 However, as
Medicare moves to payment systems that shift the financial risk of
providing excess services from the program to the provider-as is
the case with prospective payment and especially capitation-the
Medicare program must take greater responsibility for monitoring
the quality of services. With the shift in risk, incentives now exist
for providers to curtail services inappropriately to achieve savings.
HCFA has moved aggressively to improve its monitoring of
quality of services to Medicare beneficiaries. When Medicare
moved to prospective payment for hospitals, Congress established
the Peer Review Program to monitor provider behavior under that
new payment system.1s7 Over the years, Congress has added to the
quality assurance and improvement functions of PROs.1' Subsequently, HCFA became an inspiring force in the move to evaluatSee supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
See generaUy Eleanor D. Kinney, PrivateAccreditationas a Substitutefor Direct Government Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs: When is it Appropriate?, 57 L. &
CONTEMp. PROBS. 47 (1994) (exploring the option of private accreditation of Medicare providers as an alternative to government monitoring of program providers).
187 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
188 See Timothy S. Jost, Administrative Law Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and
Quality Control Peer Review Organization (PRO) Program: Analysis and Recommendations,
50 Oio ST. LJ. 1, 30-53 (1989) (addressing the quality assurance and sanction pro184
185
186
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ing quality and efficacy of care on the basis of outcomes of care.18 9
Further, over the years, HCFA has embraced principles of total
quality management and continuous quality improvement as a
means of improving the care of Medicare beneficiaries. 9 ° These
modem theories of quality management borrowed from industry
have completely changed the way in which health care providers
conceptualize processes for assessing and improving the quality of
health care. 1 ' HCFA is now developing a system of outcome measures for capitated managed care that are widely used in Medicare
HMOs, Medicaid managed care plans, and private capitated health
plans.
In sum, policies and policy-making are the first line of defense,
so to speak, in protecting the legitimate interests of Medicare beneficiaries. Sound substantive policy and standards are essential and
ultimately provide the requisite guarantees of full benefits and
high-quality services for beneficiaries in the event of deprivation in
individual cases. Without sound policies and standards, individuals
have little on which to rely in administrative appeals or judicial
review.
The two most important areas of substantive policy for the
Medicare program are the coverage and quality of health care services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. Benefits and coverage policy defines the content of services and quality policy and standards
address the quality of these services. Together, coverage and quality policy and standards address pressures that capitated health
plans have to constrain costly health care services or otherwise cut
comers in ways that compromise quality of care.
It is noteworthy that the Republican legislative proposal contains a provision for the publication of coverage and quality policy
and standards.1 92 The President's proposal, in particular, contains
extensive provisions for quality policy and standards and their
gram, its criticisms and major areas of concern, and exploring two alternative means
of improving the sanction process).
189 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
190 See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
191 See generally TROYEN A. BRENNAN & DONALD M. BERWICK, NEW RULES: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND THE QuALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE (1996); DONALD M. BERWICK ET AL., CURING HEALTH CARE: NEW STRATEGIES FOR QuALrrY IMPROVEMENT
(1990); Glenn Laffel & David Blumenthal, The Casefor Using Industrial Quality Control
Management Science in Health Care
Organizations,262 JAMA 2869 (1989); see also Donald M. Berwick, ContinuousImprovement as an Ideal in Health Care; 320 NEW. ENG.J. MED. 53, 53-56 (1989); Donald M.
Berwick, Controlling Variation in Health Care: A Consultationfrom Walter Shewhart, 29
MED. CARE 1212, 1214 (1991).
192 See H.R. 2524, supra note 138.
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monitoring.1 93 The content of both proposals clearly addresses
coverage and quality issues appropriately. However, the key with
all legislated policy and standards lies with the good faith and energy with which they are enforced.
The central concern with the Medicare program is whether
governmental pressures to contain Medicare expenditures and reduce the federal budget deficit will unduly influence HCFA and its
contractors in implementing the Medicare program. In that event,
expenditure control goals will become paramount and possibly result in restrictive coverage interpretations and a lessening of quality
controls to the detriment of Medicare beneficiaries. To curb these
trends, the procedural protections of administrative adjudication
and judicial review are crucial.
B.

Adjudication Procedures

Adjudication procedures, which include grievance procedures, are an important means of protecting the legitimate interest
of beneficiaries in health care services financed by the Medicare
program. Such procedures are essential to empowering beneficiaries with the capability of enforcing accountability of the program on matters of direct concern. These procedures are also the
only practical and accessible way to resolve disputes between beneficiaries and managed care plans which, in reality, make the critical
coverage decisions and control quality for all individual beneficiaries in the day-to-day course of clinical care.
There are certain principles that guide the design and operation of patient protection mechanisms in any managed care plan,
which I have described and discussed in greater detail in other articles I have written on administrative procedures under health reform and managed care.194 Basically, these principles are as
follows: any procedure is appropriate provided that certain procedural elements are present. There are four key elements.
First, there should be timely notice that appealable events
have occurred and of the procedures for appeals. This includes
notice of applicable medical practice guidelines that govern coverage under the plan. Second, there should be prompt decisions by
a knowledgeable, unbiased decision-maker. In any adjudication
system, speed and expertise in the decision-making process are key
to providing genuine relief. Third, large areas for the exercise of
See PRESIDENT'S MEDICARE PROPOSAL, supra note 164.
See generally Kinney, ProtectingConsumers and Providers,supra note 2; Kinney, ProceduralPvtections for Consumers, supra note 2.
193
194
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discretion should be accorded to the decision maker. Although
counterintuitive, decision makers need to have the latitude to provide satisfactory relief to an appellant. Hard and fast rules on coverage, for example, imposed more constraints on payers as well as
on the clinical decisionmaking of physicians within the plan.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there should be methods for empowering patients in the grievance process. This is a
troubling issue given the inherent disparity between patients and
plans in terms of power and expertise. A grievance procedure
should be informal and comprehensible enough that patients can
negotiate on their own behalf. However, the patient should have
the option of retaining counsel or other representation.
These principles are especially important in the case of Medicare beneficiaries because of the characteristics of the Medicare
population. Specifically, Medicare beneficiaries are either elderly,
severely disabled, or very sick (in the case of beneficiaries with End
Stage Renal Disease). In any event, they are heavy users of health
care services and are often, because of illness and infirmity, disadvantaged when it comes to protecting their access to health care
services in the health care system.
The current procedures for grievance resolution and administrative appeals are well-designed in most respects. The system requires HMOs to have an informal grievance procedure in which
HCFA ostensibly has no interest. 195 However, there is a reconsideration process for decisions reached in grievance procedures in
which HCFA does have an interest and which is completely separated from the HMO. 196 Although criticized in recent litigation197
as being untimely, this process is an important safeguard for beneficiaries who seek to challenge decisions regarding their Medicare
benefits without resorting to further administrative process orjudicial review. Further, the same system of administrative review for
beneficiaries in Medicare HMOs and CHPs as for fee-for-service
Medicare1 9 8 allows for comparable treatment of all Medicare beneficiaries as well as consistent agency review of challenged policy
and other issues.
The grievance procedures and administrative review provisions of the Republican legislative proposal1 99 contain many of the
195 Kinney, Resolving Consumer Grievances, supra note 2, at
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same important protections as the current Medicare system for
Medicare HMOs, including independent reconsideration and administrative review.20 0 Under the President's proposal, current reconsideration and administrative and judicial review procedures
would remain. 0
The challenge for any dispute resolution system for the Medicare program in the coming years is funding and resources. Put
simply, will the stewards 'of the Medicare program, in the midst of
straining to reduce Medicare program expenditures, devote the
requisite resources to ensure that Medicare beneficiaries have access to a dispute resolution system that resolves disputes in a timely
and fair manner? In short, with the Medicare program in a time of
budgetary constraints, resources and official commitment rather
than statutory language delineating a process will determine
whether Medicare beneficiaries obtain justice in the resolution of
their disputes.
C. Judicial Review
Another key issue is the degree to which consumers and providers may challenge decisions and policies of a Medicare health
plan in state and/or federal court. To many consumers and providers, judicial review is perceived as the ultimate forum for assuring
accountability of government or corporate actors. Further, courts
have played a strong role in protecting rights of consumers with
20 2
respect to government entitlement programs in the past.
Nevertheless, there are limits to what judicial review can accomplish in the protection of the legitimate interest of beneficiaries in covered Medicare benefits. Specifically, judicial review is
an especially ineffective means of changing policy. 2 3 Indeed, since
the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense
Counci12 4 the Supreme Court has sharply curtailed the scope of
review for federal courts in evaluating agency interpretations of
their enabling legislation. But even before Chevron, the federal
courts were reluctant to second-guess Medicare policy and generally deferred to HCFA interpretations upon judicial review. 0 5
See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
See generally Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts,Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 439 (1993).
203 Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making under Health Reform, 47 ADMIN. L. Rsv.
403, 423 (1995).
200
201
202

204
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467 U.S. 837 (1984).

See Kinney, The Role of Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 765-74 (detailing the ex-
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Judicial review still plays a crucial role in protecting consumers
in getting the amount, duration, and scope of benefits which carefully crafted statutory benefits language and coverage standards establish. Without judicial review, individual beneficiaries will have
no recourse when managed care plans, in an effort to contain expenditures, restrictively interpret coverage policy and attempt to
limit services for beneficiaries. Further, they would have no recourse if managed care plans do not comport with quality standards except to the extent that quality breaches constitute medical
malpractice and give rise to a common law tort claim. In sum,judicial review is an important mechanism available to beneficiaries to
ensure that the stewards of the Medicare program and the managed care plans with which Medicare contracts to provide services
are accountable to all statutory standards and requirements
designed to provide Medicare beneficiaries with health care services of high quality.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The years ahead will inevitably see a move toward capitated
managed care for Medicare beneficiaries. This move, although appropriate from the perspective of addressing many of the inefficiencies of fee-for-service medicine which promoted overutilization
of costly services in many instances, must be accomplished with
care. To protect beneficiaries, the major objective in this transition must be the promotion of high quality services for all
beneficiaries.
Procedural protections for individual beneficiaries such as
rule and policy making procedures, grievance procedures, and judicial review can only achieve beneficial outcomes if: (1) the underlying design of the program is sound; (2) the statute,
regulations, and program policies faithfully convey that underlying
design; and (3) the stewards of the program and their contractors
faithfully implement the program.

panding availability and the restriction of the scope of judicial review for Medicare
and Medicaid programs).

